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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 09/12/2019

Accident number: 826

Accident time: 07:33

Accident Date: 06/09/2017

Where it occurred: Area 2, CBU-575 FO,
UTM 704262-3667890,
Tayr Harfa village
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Lebanon

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Vegetation removal
accident

Date of main report: 06/09/2017

ID original source: 9/2017

Name of source: RMAC-N

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M77 Submunition

Ground condition: bushes/scrub; dense
vegetation; trees;
woodland

Date record created:

Date last modified: 09/12/2019

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Alt. coord. system: UTM 704262-3667890 Coordinates fixed by:

Accident Notes
disciplinary action against victim (?)
inadequate training (?)
vegetation clearance problem (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
A report of this accident was made available by the national mine action authority in 2019.
Some of the original formatting has been removed but the original report is held on file. The
substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. Text in square brackets [ ]
is editorial.
REGIONAL MINE ACTION CENTRE - NABATIYEH (RMAC-N)
BOARD OF INQUIRY (BOI) INVESTIGATION REPORT Ref No. 9/2017
Report Category: Accident: BAC SUBMUNITION
Cause: Uncontrolled detonation of mine/UXO by: Human
Report Compiled By: RMAC-N, [name removed], RMAC-N Chief of QA
Location: Tayr Harfa, Date: 6th September 2017
Casualty(s): Human
Agency Involved: [International demining organisation]
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1. Introduction
In accordance with National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), the Chief of RMAC-N [name
removed] issued a Verbal Convening Order on Wednesday the 6th of September 2017 for an
accident investigation Board of Inquiry (BOI).
The board members are [name removed] RMAC-N Chief of QA, QA officer [name removed],
QA officer[name removed], QA medic [name removed] and RMAC-N CLO [name removed].
This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry (BOI) into the RMAC Accident that
occurred on the 6th of September 2017 which is based on the RMAC-N investigation,
statements from [International demining organisation] personnel involved in the accident and
evidence from the accident site.
The accident occurred at 07:33hrs (local time) on the 6th of September 2017 in Area 2, CBU575 FO, Coordinates 704262-3667890 which is located in Tayr Harfa village.
The BOI is an impartial investigation conducted by the RMAC-N on behalf of the Lebanon
Mine Action Centre (LMAC). The primary objective of the BOI is to examine evidence in order
to conclude the cause of the accident and make recommendations for the prevention of
further accidents.
2. Executive Summary
On the 6th of September 2017at [International demining organisation] task CBU-575 FO, an
uncontrolled detonation of an M77 sub-munitions occurred while [International demining
organisation]BAC 2 searcher [the Victim] was working in his lane at 07:33 am, 5 minutes
before taking his first break, and led to an injury.
The injuries sustained by [the Victim] resulted in severe wounds and fractures in his hands
and legs, fragmentations in the chest and head and injuries to the eyes.
Based on all available evidences, the BOI team concludes that the accident occurred with the
searcher while he was cutting vegetation in his clearance lane (un-cleared area), with a saw
which disturbed the sub-munitions and caused the accident.
There is conclusive evidence to suggest that incorrect procedures were applied and that [the
Victim] was not working in accordance with [International demining organisation] Lebanon
SOP and National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) at that time.
The RMAC BOI team considers that; the accident was caused by an SOP breach.
3. Location of Accident: CBU-575 FO, Area 2–BAC 2, Tayr Harfa Village, UTM 704262–
3667890
4. Date and Time of Accident: 6th of September 2017, 07:33hrs (local time).
5. Reported By: [name removed], Operations manager, [International demining organisation]
6. Reported To: [name removed], Chief of RMAC-N
7. Person(s) Involved: [the Victim], [International demining organisation] Searcher/deminer
8. Investigation Team: [Name removed]n, Chief of QA, RMAC-N; W.O. [name removed],
RMAC-N; W.O. [name removed], RMAC-N; [name removed] QA Medic, RMAC-N; [name
removed], CLO, RMAC-N
9. Date and Time of Investigation: 6th of September 2017, 09:25hrs (local time).
10. Execution of the Investigation
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Approach to Site
The accident site is located at IMSMA Task number CBU-575 FO which is located in Tayr
Harfa village. [International demining organisation] BAC 2 started clearance at CBU-575 FO
on the 25th of April 2016, cleared to date 97,760 m2 and destroyed 2,907 sub-munitions.
The RMAC-N investigation team, [Name removed], [Name removed] and [Name removed]
arrived to the accident site at 09:25 am. RMAC-N CLO [Name removed] met the casualty at
Jabal Amel Hospital.
After a site briefing and arrival formalities, the team began the investigation. The BOI team
approached the accident location and met [International demining organisation] OM [Name
removed] and BAC 2 SS [Name removed] at the site.
Process: Visual; Verbal; Instrument (Schonstedt locator).
11. Evidence
11.1 Ground
Accident Site
The location of the accident was on the north east side of CBU-575 FO. The area consists of
flat to medium slope ground containing medium to thick vegetation (mostly oak trees and
bushes and high grass) and some rocky outcrops in the area. The land is not cultivated but
sometimes used as grazing for goats.
The accident was located 50 cm away from the base stick in searcher [the Victim]’s clearance
lane towards the dangerous area.
An accident occurred at the same task on the 18th of July 2017 where an [International
demining organisation] searcher received injuries to his right hand due to the detonation of an
M77 sub-munitions (same breach of vegetation cutting procedures).
Marking: Marking in general on the task was in accordance with NMAS and [International
demining organisation] SOP.
Crater: The crater is located about 50 cm following the base stick towards the dangerous (uncleared) area.
11.2 Vehicle(s) and Equipment
Ambulance: One ambulance and medic was located at CBU-575 FO at the time of the
accident.
Searcher Tools
The Schonstedt locator was located just behind the base stick.
The Schonstedt was turned on with a high sensitivity setting when the BOI team arrived.
The searcher’s tools were also located just behind the base stick.
Items damaged
• The searcher’s working gloves were shattered due to the explosion. [A picture shows
the torn gardening gloves.]
• The searcher’s saw was damaged due to the explosion. [A picture shows several
teeth missing near the tip of the one-handed saw.]
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
The searcher’s PPE was damaged as follows:
• Several shrapnel in the vest but only one penetrated. [A picture shows a hole in the
outer cover below the collar.]
• Several fragmentations scratches on the visor and the helmet.
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11.3 Explosive Ordnance involved in accident
The type of explosive ordnance involved in the accident is believed to be one M77 submunitions; weighing approx. 250 g in total (Dual Purpose sub-munitions containing approx. 45
g of high explosives(RDX/TNT), point detonation impact fuze). [The weight of the firing pin
falling through a few millimetres provides enough inertia to carry the striker forward into the
stab-sensitive detonator.]

[The picture shows fragments recovered from the site.]
11.4 Casualty Information
Casualty’s position: Searcher [the Victim].
According to the injury and to the statement of the searcher, he was standing and cutting
vegetation with a saw which obviously disturbed the sub-munitions and caused the explosion.
Description of Injuries of searcher [the Victim].
The searcher sustained:
− Fragmentation in the right eye which resulted in him losing that eye.
− Fragmentation below the left eye which was removed and he still has vision.
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−
−
−

−
−
−

Fragmentation went through the inside right of his helmet and caused injuries to his
head which are not believed to be life threatening.
There are minor lacerations on his right hand which not serious.
Ali received numerous injuries on his left hand resulting in the loss of his small finger.
He received other serious injuries to his left hand but we do not know to what extent
at this time.
Broken right knee cap.
Fragmentation in both legs.
Fragmentation in the chest which is believed to have entered his right lung.
(medical report attached) [Medical report not made available.]

11.5 Interviews
The following [International demining organisation] personnel were interviewed by the RMACN BOI team on 6thof September2017 at CBU-575 FO.
[International demining organisation] [Name removed], BAC 2, Site Supervisor (SS)
[International demining organisation] [Name removed], BAC 2, Team Leader
[International demining organisation] [Name removed], BAC 2, Deputy Team Leader
[International demining organisation] [Name removed], BAC 2, Searcher
[International demining organisation] [Name removed], BAC 2, Searcher
[International demining organisation] [Name removed], BAC 2, Medic
12. Accident Details (Circumstances / Sequence of Events)
CBU-575 FO is a site located in Tayr Harfa village area 2; the area containing CBU-575 FO
and adjacent sites was heavily bombarded by the IE during 2006 hostilities; [International
demining organisation] was tasked to start clearance at this site on April 20th 2016,
[International demining organisation] BAC 2 started clearance at the site on April 25th 2016
and cleared to date 97,760 sqm and destroyed 2,907sub-munitions ( M42, M46 and M77).
The majority of the destroyed items were found on the surface while the rest were found at
different depths (not deeper than 7 cm).
On the 6th of September 2017 when [International demining organisation] BAC 2 deployed to
clearance site, all searchers were guided to their lanes, started working; team located 5 M 77
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sub-munitions before the accident occurred, during that time both TL and SS have passed by
searcher [the Victim]’s lane and other team members.
At the lane where the accident occurred the injured searcher was cutting vegetation in the
un-cleared area using a saw (Schonstedt locator was found turned on with high sensitivity
setting, located just behind the base stick, about 70 cm away from the explosion location; the
base stick was 50 cm behind the accident location and vegetation was cut to an extent of 120
cm following the base stick towards the dangerous area).
During the internal investigation an M77 sub-munition was located on the surface right next to
cut vegetation in a different lane than the one where the accident occurred; which shows
weakness in supervision, command and control not just in the lane where the accident
occurred, but in the entire task.

The following information is based on an assessment of the evidence obtained by the RMACN BOI team at the accident site and from witnesses' statements.
Chronology of Events (According to witness statements and site documentation)
6th of September 2017:
06:36 - Arrival at the site. Morning brief by SS and locators tests. The team split into 2
groups, one group monitored by the TL [Name removed], the second by Deputy TL
[Name removed].
06:51 - Start of operations.
07:33 - Accident occurs
07:35 - SS [Name removed] informed [International demining organisation] OM and
[International demining organisation] radio room and tasked the medic to deal with
the casualty and prepare it for being evacuated to the hospital.
07:36 - RMAC-N was informed.
07:37 - The injured searcher was evacuated from his clearance lane to the medical
point by searcher [Name removed] and TL [Name removed] where he received the

6

treatment needed by medic [Name removed] and got prepared for being evacuated to
the hospital.
07:50 - Ambulance left the site evacuating the casualty to Jabal Amel Hospital in
Tyre.
08:02 - [International demining organisation] OM [Name removed] and OO [Name
removed] arrived to the accident site.
08:15 - The ambulance evacuating the casualty reached Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre.
08:34 - [International demining organisation] PM [Name removed] arrived to the
accident site.
09:16 - [International demining organisation] PM [Name removed] left the site.
09:35 - RMAC-N BOI team arrived to site and started the investigation.
09:35 - RMAC-N BOI team conducted QC in the injured searcher’s lane and located
one M 77 sub-munition that was not marked or located by the searcher about 40 cm
away from the explosion in the area where vegetation were cut to ground.
10:42 - RMAC-N BOI team left the site heading to Jabal Amel Hospital.
12:00 - The casualty was moved from Jabal Amel Hospital heading to Hammoud
Hospital in Saida for further treatment and medical operations.
12:45 - The casualty reached Hammoud Hospital in Saida.
The investigation was followed up by a visit to the hospital to take the statements of the
casualty and Medical report on the 6th of September 2017 by the BOI team.
12.1 Medical Assistance and Evacuation (procedure, treatment, equipment.)
On the 6th of September 2017, there was one medic [Name removed] at task CBU-575 FO
who was positioned with the ambulance and the driver at the control point during clearance
operations.
At 07:33 hrs an explosion occurred. The medic moved immediately, and reached the accident
location, finding one casualty [the Victim], he conducted first aid and stabilization procedures
with the searcher [Name removed] and then evacuated the casualty to Jabal Amel Hospital
accompanied by TL [Name removed] having the same blood group as the casualty should he
need it.
According to the statements from [International demining organisation] personnel at the site
and from the radio log, the time taken for the casualty treatment at site was 17 minutes and
the time to reach the hospital from the site was 24 minutes.
The last CASEVAC exercise was conducted on 29th August 2017.
12.2 Geography and Climate
The area of the accident site is located in Tayr Harfa village.
The task site is on a mainly flat area (some areas are slightly sloping) containing thick to
medium vegetation consisting mainly oak trees and some bushes and high grass with some
rocky areas.
At the time of the accident the weather was clear and hot. Visibility was good
12.3 Communications
[International demining organisation] BAC 2 utilized handheld VHF Radios for internal team
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communications. Communications between the team and the RMAC-N were maintained by
VHF radio. The team also had access to mobile phones.
12.4 Command and Control
The [International demining organisation] team composition was in accordance to their SOP;
previous internal and external QA reports had indicated good command & control in general;
nevertheless some gaps were noticed by RMAC-N QA regarding vegetation cutting
procedures and were highlighted to the team to improve.
12.5 Quality Assurance and Quality Control
External QA: Between the period stretching from the25th of April 2016 to current date a
weekly basis RMAC-N QA inspections were conducted at CBU-575 FO.
Accreditation: [International demining organisation] BAC 2 received a renewal for the full
accreditation on January 2017.
Training: The last training received by [International demining organisation] BAC 2 was on
the 19th of July 2017 due to the accident that occurred on 18th July 2017 within the same
team.
13. Details of Non Compliance to Agency SOP / NMAS / IMAS
The following points are clear and obvious evidence of breach of [International demining
organisation] SOP / NMAS:
1. Cutting vegetation methodology applied by the searcher (cutting to an extent of 1.2
meters following the base stick in an un-cleared area without checking with the
locator).
2. The injured searcher was cutting vegetation standing, not kneeling.
3. Lack of command and control concerning both the SS and the TL (they both checked
the injured searcher’s lane before the accident and did not apply the correct
procedures, in addition most of clearance lanes at that site were being cleared the
same way; over reaching in vegetation cutting).
14. Task Status: Current: Start Date (25th April 2016)
15. Background Information
CBU-575 FO is a CBU task within the task dossier issued to [International demining
organisation] by the RMAC-N. CBU-575 FO is a heavily bombarded area by the IE during
2006 hostilities.
16 Conclusions
From the evidence gathered the board concluded the following:
a. An uncontrolled detonation of an M77 sub-munitions occurred with the searcher [the
Victim] while he was cutting vegetation
b. The searcher was standing in his lane (in an un-cleared area), not using the base
stick, he was cutting vegetation from the entire lane before checking with the locator
(adopting a different clearance methodology than the one approved in the clearance
plan).
c.

The detonation was most likely caused by impact when hitting the sub-munition with
the saw.

d. Neither the TL nor the SS took any actions to adopt the correct vegetation cutting
procedures (weakness in command and control).
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e. The casualty evacuation from the site to the hospital was carried out in a timely and
professional manner.
f.

PPE (body armour and visor) were worn in compliance with [International demining
organisation] SOP/NMAS, nevertheless the visor was obviously not placed correctly
which caused injuries to the eyes.

g. During investigation RMAC BOI team received full cooperation from [International
demining organisation].
The accident is considered to be conclusive as preventable.
17. Further Actions and Recommendations
Three days refresher training to be conducted for all [International demining organisation]
teams including: the use of the detector, the right marking procedures, vegetation cutting,
rocks and stones removal, command and control and procedures taken after an accident on
site.
a- Closer and accurate supervision from all levels to ensure there is strict adherence to
task Clearance Plan, [International demining organisation] SOP and NMAS.
b- [International demining organisation] to emphasize on the internal Quality
Management process, by separating QA/QC from Operations.
c- A written warning to be issued to [International demining organisation] BAC 2
searcher [the Victim].
d- [International demining organisation] SS [Name removed] and TL [Name removed] to
be demoted to searchers.
e- [International demining organisation] BAC 2 to be moved to a different site.
Report Written and Agreed By: [Name removed], RMAC-N, Chief of QA
RMAC-N Chief of OPS, [Name removed]
Chief of RMAC-N, [Name removed].

Victim Report
Victim number: 1044

Name: [Name removed]

Age:

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: no

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 41 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Protection used: Frontal apron, visor
worn raised

Summary of injuries: Amp eye; Amp finger; minor Hand; severe Chest; severe Eye; severe
Hand; severe Head; severe Legs
COMMENT: No medical report was made available.
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a ‘Field control inadequacy’ because the Victim
(and others) was working incorrectly and the field supervisors did nothing to correct the
errors. The visor was worn in a raised position and the locator was not used to check
vegetation before cutting it (despite a recent accident involving a submunition entangled in
vegetation). The fact that field behaviour was not revised after the first accident reflects a
failure of senior management to review and correct the behaviour of field supervisors. It may
be that both the field supervisors and the searcher/deminers were not appropriately trained. It
is the responsibility of senior management to ensure that field supervisors are appropriately
trained and supervised. Their failure to do this explains why the secondary cause is listed as
a ‘Management control inadequacy’.
The accident investigators recommended that internal QA/QC be separated from Operations.
This can give internal organisational QA/QC a measure of ‘independence’ from the field
supervisors as long as the internal QA/QC people are appropriately trained and command the
necessary authority to correct errors.
The accident investigators recommended that the field supervisors be demoted and that all
staff receive refresher training. If the original training failed to result in staff having the
required knowledge and skills, it is probable that repeating that training would also fail. The
demining organisation should have devised effective ‘Continuation’ training for all staff
(including supervisors), and included tests to ensure that knowledge and skills had been
transferred and retained.
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